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Relationship  Between  Fed Cattle Market
Shares  and Prices  Paid by Beefpackers  in
Localized  Markets
Clement  E.  Ward
Industrial  organization  theory  hypothesizes  that  larger  beefpackers  can  depress
prices  paid for  cattle.  Prices  paid between  at least  two beefpackers  in  some localized
markets studied were found to be significantly different for the one-month  study period.
However,  larger beefpackers  in each market paid neither lower or higher prices than the
smallest buyer,  with just one exception.  No  significant  relationship  was found between
market  shares  of buyers  and  average  prices  paid for  cattle.  Thus,  the  hypothesis  that
larger beefpackers  pay significantly lower  prices  was rejected.
There  is  a clear  lack  of concensus  among
agricultural economists regarding whether or
not the  beefpacking  industry  is  competitive
[Ahmaddaud,  et  al.;  Connor;  Hall,  et  al.;
Multop  and Helmuth;  Schnittker Associates;
Ward  1980;  and  Williams].  Implicit  or  ex-
plicit conclusions  range  from one extreme -
that  beefpacking  is  the  last  remnant  of per-
fect  competition;  to  the  polar  opposite  con-
clusion - that there are serious anticompeti-
tive practices  by beefpackers  stemming from
increasing  concentration.  Previous  studies
can  be  challenged,  but the  purpose  here  is
not to  critically  review previous  work.
Purpose of this paper is to report empirical
evidence  on prices  paid for fed cattle  among
beefpackers  and on the relationship between
market  share  and  prices  paid  in  relatively
localized  markets.  Previous studies implicitly
or  explicitly  suggest  that data from  localized
markets  are  appropriate  in  examining  the
relationship  between  market  structure  and
performance  [Ahmaddaud,  et  al.;  Multop
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and  Helmuth;  Packers  and  Stockyards  Pro-
gram;  Ward 1980;  and Williams].  This study
was  based  on primary  data (individual  trans-
actions)  from  cattle  feedlots,  enabling  a  dif-
ferent methodology  than previous  studies.
Conceptual  Framework
Bain  hypothesized  a  causal  relationship
emanating  from  market  structure,  through
market  conduct,  to  market  performance.
Both  before  and after  he formalized  the  in-
dustrial organization  model,  economists have
attempted  to  identify desirable performance
norms  and  determine  appropriate  perform-
ance  measures.  Jesse  summarized  several
such  attempts  at  identifying  performance
criteria,  but defining  quantifyable  measures
is  difficult.
The  most  commonly  used  industrial  or-
ganization  norm  is the  perfectly  competitive
model.  Demsetz,  however,  questions  its ap-
propriateness  as a norm, given that it is more
of an ideal rather than a practical alternative.
Greig suggests there are social costs resulting
from market power of firms in an imperfectly
competitive market structure,  but that there
are also social costs resulting from an atomist-
ic  market  structure,  which  approaches  the
theoretically  perfect  market model.  Bressler
and Sosnick,  too, have questioned the appro-
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priateness of the perfectly competitive model
as a performance  norm. Thus, there seems to
be no acceptable norm  for measuring market
performance  which  meets  both  theoretical
and practical criteria.  However,  performance
measures  can  be  compared  over  time  and
conclusions  drawn  about  directional  change
in selected  performance  criteria.
Structure  of  the  beefpacking  industry  is
imperfectly  competitive,  and  categorizing
the structure depends on the relevant market
size  assumed.  The  four-firm  concentration
ratio  for  steer  and  heifer  slaughter  in  the
U.S.  increased  from  29.5  in  1969  to  31.7  in
1978  [Packers  and  Stockyards  Program].1 2
National  four-firm  concentration  ratios  are
inappropriate  for  studying  performance  in
cattle  procurement.  Most  cattle  are  pur-
chased  within  100  miles  of  a plant,  though
some  cattle  are  regularly  purchased  300
miles  or  more  from  the  plant  [Packers  and
Stockyards  Program;  Ward  1979].
Studies  confirm  that  buyer  concentration
is higher in smaller market areas.  Sales from
feedlots  in  403  counties  in  6  major feeding
states  were  studied  in  1975  [Packers  and
Stockyards  Program].  In  33.8  percent of the
counties,  the four largest  buyers in  each  re-
spective  county bought 65 percent or more of
all cattle sold in that county. 3 Interviews with
meatpacker-buyers  indicated  that  they  pur-
chased  between  15  and  75  percent  of  fed
cattle sold in their defined area (ranging from
one-half to four counties) and  as  much  as 90-
'It  can  be  argued  whether  or  not  steer  and  heifer
slaughter comprise  the relevant product  market.  Steer
and heifer  data were assumed  relevant  since  this study
was  concerned  with pricing  of and competition  for fed
cattle from  feedlots.
2Data  used  by  the  Packers  and  Stockyards  Program  is
not  without  criticism  but  is  cited  here  because  it  is
believed  to  be  acceptably  accurate  for  the purpose  of
discussing  the general  structural  characteristics  of the
beefpacking  industry.
3The four largest buyers  in  one county were not  neces-
sarily  the  same  as the  four  largest buyers  in  any other
county.
95 percent of the cattle from a given commu-
nity  or  near  their  slaughter  facility  [Ward
1979].
Market  structure  data  alone  provide  no
conclusive  information  about  economic  per-
formance.  Theoretically,  structure  suggests
something about potential market pricing be-
havior, and ultimately about potential market
performance.  Industrial  organization  theory
hypothesizes  that larger firms in imperfectly
competitive  procurement  markets  can  de-
press input prices  relative  to those expected
in  a  perfectly  competitive  market  [Bain,
Scherer].  Packers  and  Stockyards  Program
cites  studies  supporting  this  relationship  in
the livestock and poultry industries,  but em-
pirical  evidence  is limited.4
It  is  hypothesized  here  that  in  relatively
small geographic  markets, larger beefpackers
pay  significantly  lower  prices  for  fed  cattle
than their smaller  competitors.  Thus,  an in-
verse  relationship  is expected between  mar-
ket share and average  prices  paid.
Model  Specification
Two models  were  specified and estimated
to determine whether there was  a significant
difference between  prices  paid by beefpack-
ers.  Both  models  are  specified by
(1) TPFC  =  f(DBi,  TRND,  PCHG,
PYG3,  P6/7,  DRPR,  LVWT)
where
TPFC =  Transaction  price  for  each  sale
lot of cattle  on a liveweight basis
($/cwt.)
DBi  =  Zero-one  dummy  variable  for
the  ith buyer
TRND  =  Trend  variable
PCHG  =  Percentage  of cattle  in  each  lot
estimated  to  be  quality  grade
choice  or above
4Concentration  is only one element of market structure,
but is  the primary element  of concern  in this study.
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PYG3  =  Percentage  of cattle  in  each  lot
estimated  to be yield  grade  3 or
above
P6/7  =  Percentage  of cattle  in  each  lot
estimated  to  yield  600-700
pound carcasses
DRPR  =  Estimated average dressing per-
centage of the  lot
LVWT  =  Estimated average live weight of
the lot.
Sale  price  (TPFC)  was  hypothesized  to
differ among beefpackers (DBi) after account-
ing for variation  due  to cattle  quality  differ-
ences and time of purchase.  A trend variable
(TRND)  was  included  because  there  was  a
downward  movement  in carcass and live cat-
tle  prices  during  the  study  period.  Thus,
cattle purchased  later in the period cost less
than  comparable  quality  cattle  purchased
earlier  in the  period.  Several  variables  were
included to remove price variation associated
with  cattle  quality  differences,  i.e.  differ-
ences  in  carcass  weight  (P6/7),  live  weight
(LVWT),  quality  grade  (PCHG),  yield  grade
(PYG3),  and dressing percentage  (DRPR).
The  two  models  estimated  differed  in
terms of the omitted dummy variable.  In the
first model,  the omitted dummy variable was
the buyer  with the  smallest  market  share of
the cattle purchased  from feedlots  in a given
market  during  the  study  period.  Thus,  the
model estimated price differences among the
smallest  and larger  buyers,  after  accounting
for  price  differences  associated  with  cattle
quality  and  time  of purchase.  The  omitted
dummy variable in the second model was the
buyer  paying  the  lowest  average  price  in  a
given  market.  Thus,  the second  model  indi-
cated  whether  there  was  a  significant  price
difference among the lowest paying and high-
er  paying  buyers,  irrespective  of size,  after
accounting  for  cattle  quality  differences  and
time  of purchase.
Data and Procedure
Paul  suggests  the  level  of aggregation  in
many  industrial  organization  studies  causes
problems  in interpreting the often-found cor-
relation  between  concentration  and  price
levels.  The  procedure  in  this  study  was  to
take  a  cross-section  of  microeconomic  data
and  to  analyze  prices  paid in relatively  nar-
rowly  defined  geographic  and  product  mar-
kets.
Data were  collected  from  26  commercial
feedlots  sampled  in  Texas,  Oklahoma,  and
Kansas,  and from  3  marketing  agents  repre-
senting  cattle  feeders  in  three  multicounty
areas  of Nebraska and  Iowa.  Data were  col-
lected on 344  pens of cattle  (transactions) or
51,586 head  sold during July 1979.  The rela-
tively short data collection period was  chosen
because  of the  respondent  burden to record
requested  data.
Feedlot  operators  and  marketing  agents
were  asked  to  record  data  on  each  pen  of
cattle offered  for sale.  Data were  requested:
(1) before buyers bid on cattle (e.g. cattle sex,
estimated  proportion  of  choice  grade  or
above,  estimated  proportion of yield  grade 3
or  above,  estimated  proportion  of carcasses
weighing 600-700 pounds,  and estimated  av-
erage  live  weight  and dressing  percentage);
(2)  during  the  pricing  process  (e.g.  seller's
asking  price,  and  first  and  highest  bid  for
each  bidder);  and  (3)  after  cattle  were  sold
(e.g. sale price,  beefpacker-buyer,  and terms
of delivery).
Data were divided by geographic area and
sex  (i.e.  steers and heifers).  Areas  and their
approximate  size  were:  Texas  South  Plains,
23 counties;  Texas  North  Plains,  15 counties;
Oklahoma Panhandle,  3 counties;  Southwest
Kansas,  23  counties;  Eastern  Nebraska  and
Northwest  Iowa,  4  counties  each;  and  Cen-
tral  Iowa,  6  counties.  Two  areas  were  com-
bined  for the analysis  (Eastern Nebraska and
Northwest  Iowa) due to  a limited number  of
observations  of either steers or heifers in the
two  areas.
Twelve area-sex equations were  estimated
by OLS  regression  for each  model  to deter-
mine whether or not beefpackers paid signifi-
cantly different prices for cattle purchased.  A
second test of the market share - price level
relationship  was  made  by computing  Spear-
man's coefficient of rank correlation  and test-
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ing for significance  [Snedecor and Cochran].5
Buyers  in each  area-sex  market were ranked
in terms  of their  market  share  and  average
price  paid  after accounting for  cattle  quality
and  time  of purchase.  Largest  buyers  and
those  paying  the  highest  average  price  in
each area-sex  market were given the  rank of
1.  Data  were  then  pooled  across  area-sex
markets to compute Spearman's rank correla-
tion coefficient.
Empirical Results
Six  beefpackers  were  found  to  be  the
largest  buyer  in  at  least  one  of  12  area-sex
markets,  and one buyer was the  largest  in 4
markets. Table 1 shows share of purchases for
the  largest  and  four  largest  buyers  in  each
market.  For  all  12  markets  combined,  15
firms  were  among the four largest buyers  at
least  once,  and  one  beefpacker  was  among
the four largest buyers  in  8 markets.
5Spearman's  rank  correlation coefficient  is
6 Id
2
r,  1  --
n(n
2 -1)
where  1 >  rs  > - 1,  d is  the difference  in  rank  of X 1
(market share)  and X 2 (average  price paid), and n  is  the
number  of observations.  The  appropriate  significance
test  is  based  on  Student's  t  distribution  with  n  - 2
degrees  of freedom.
Models  estimated  indicated  there  were
statistically  significant  price  differences
among beefpackers  in one-half of the  twelve
area-sex  markets,  after  accounting  for  cattle
quality  differences  and time of purchase. 6 A
significant  difference  was  found  between
prices  paid  by  the  smallest  buyer  and  one
larger  buyer  in  one  market  (Table  2).  The
sixth  largest  of 8 heifer  buyers  in the  Texas
North  Plains  paid significantly  higher prices
($3.45/cwt.)  than  the  smallest  buyer  during
the study  period.
Thus,  larger buyers  generally  did  not pay
either  lower or  higher prices  than  the smal-
lest buyer in the relatively  localized markets
studied.  Results were contrary to the inverse
relationship  hypothesized  between  market
share  and average  price paid (that large buy-
ers use market power to depress input prices
in localized  markets),  based on industrial  or-
ganization  theory.
6Time  of purchase  (TRND)  was  not  significant  in  one
equation.  Cattle  quality grade  (PCHG) was  significant
in  one-half the equations,  but other cattle  characteris-
tics  hypothesized  to  account  for  cattle  quality  differ-
ences  were  inconsistently  significant.  Neither  yield
grade  (PYG3),  carcass  weight  (P6/7),  live  weight
(LVWT),  or dressing percentage  (DRPR)  were  signifi-
cant  in more  than  one equation so  were  dropped from
results  reported here.  Lack of significance  may be due
to  relatively little variation  in data for these variables.
TABLE 1.  Market Shares  for the  Largest and  Four  Largest Buyers,  by Area  and  Sex.a
Steers  Heifers
Largest  Four  Largest  Largest  Four Largest
Area  Buyer  Buyers  Buyer  Buyers
------------------------------------------- percent ---------------------------------------
Texas  South Plains  40.3  98.7  36.5  87.4
Texas  North  Plains  45.3  98.6  33.4  85.2
Oklahoma  Panhandle  34.2  88.1  39.4  92.3
Southwest Kansas  39.2  96.1  46.5  90.6
Eastern  Nebraska
and  Northwest Iowa  27.2  75.1  25.0  69.6
Central  Iowa  48.9  100.  42.4  94.5
aMarket shares reported  are the proportion  of total number of cattle purchased  in each area-sex market.
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The largest buyer did pay  lowest prices  in
two  markets  (Texas  South  Plains  - heifers
and Central  Iowa - steers),  but  not signifi-
cantly  different  from  other prices  paid.  The
corollary  situation,  but  still  consistent  with
that hypothesized,  was found in two markets
(Texas  North  Plains  - steers  and  Central
Iowa  - steers).  There,  the  smallest  buyer
paid  highest  prices,  though not  significantly
higher than other buyers.
Another  extreme  was  observed,  and  was
inconsistent  with the  hypothesized  relation-
ship.  The  smallest buyer  paid lowest  prices
in  three  markets  (Texas  North  Plains  -
steers,  Oklahoma  Panhandle  steers,  and
Easter  Nebraska-  Northwest  Iowa -heif-
ers),  but in  no  case  were  prices significantly
different  than other buyers.
Spearman's  rank  correlation  coefficient
was  also  computed  to  determine  whether
larger buyers paid a lower price than smaller
ones.  The  rank  correlation  coefficient  was
positive  (rs  =  .096),  but was not  statistically
significant  different  from  zero  at  the  .01
level.  Thus,  the hypothesis  that  larger beef-
packers exhibit  market power  by depressing
input prices for cattle purchased in relatively
localized markets  is rejected in this study.
Implications and Conclusions
Competition  research  lacks  a  definitive
norm for comparing what is vs. what ought to
be.  Thus,  research  such  as  this  can  best  be
considered  a benchmark  for future empirical
studies  and an  aid in  suggesting hypotheses
to be tested, as well as aiding identification  of
areas  needing  theoretical attention.
Market  shares of the largest buyer in area-
sex markets  in this study ranged from 25.0 to
48.9 percent for  the study  period,  and  mar-
ket shares for the four largest buyers  in each
market  ranged  from  69.6  to  100  percent.
Based  on  standards  identified  by  Bain  and
Scherer,  these  market  shares  are  relatively
high,  if it is appropriate  to consider localized
markets  as  the relevant  market.
An  underlying  assumption  in  this study  is
that  studies  of  market  structure  and  price
levels  in larger  markets  may mask price  dif-
ferences in local markets.  However,  research
reported  here  found  that  price  differences
among  smallest  and  larger  buyers  occurred
once  (between  two  beefpackers)  in  the
twelve  relatively  localized  markets  studied.
Thus,  this  study  rejects  the  argument  that
larger beefpackers  pay  lower prices.
Additional  research  is needed  to study  the
hypothesized  relationship  between  market
structure  and performance.  Results here sug-
gest  that price  differences  among beefpack-
ers may occur but are dependent on variables
other  than  market  share,  such  as  access  to
and ability to use information on demand and
supply,  plant  location  and  transportation
costs,  and slaughtering  and processing  costs.
Further research could  support or refute  re-
sults presented here  by expanding  the feed-
ing areas from which data were collected, the
sample size,  or time  period analyzed.
Further research  is  also needed on market
behavior  of beefpackers.  As Journal review-
ers noted, this study did not address whether
or not large  beefpackers  acted  as  price lead-
ers  in  markets  studied  or  otherwise  influ-
enced  prices  paid by competing firms.
Finally,  a  most  difficult  research  area  is
determining  performance  norms  which  are
realistic  yet  theoretically  sound.  Imperfec-
tions in commodity markets suggest markets
such as cattle procurement  and beef market-
ing  are  imperfectly  competitive.  However,
exact  location of a market on the  continuum
between  perfect  competition  and  monopoly
and whether or not it is acceptably competi-
tive are  difficult to determine.
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